Introduction
For some time, I was agnostic over the question of whether the distinction between essence and esse was real or just formal (defining that there is a real distinction between two things only if the things can be physically separated.) More precisely, I perceived that the question was based on differences in the definitions of both essence and esse. Consecuently, I perceived that either position could be held, of course not at the same time. The situation seemed analogous to that of Quantum Mechanics formalism, where Heisenberg's matrix mechanics and Schrödinger's wave mechanics are equivalent formalisms, in the sense that using either leads to the same result, though of course they cannot be used at the same time. Or to the situation of platonism and ante rem structuralism, in philosophy of mathematics.
That was so until I read an article about how to explain at a philosophical level why Jesus' human nature is not a human person, where the solutions presented by Scotus and Suarez, out of their rejection of the real distinction between essence and esse, seemed wholy unsatisfactory from the philosophical viewpoint. Which led me to the acceptance of said real distinction, in the process that I describe below, starting with the definition of person.
Definition of person
Adopting the definition of person by Boethius: "an individual substance of a rational nature", St. Thomas Aquinas refines it by stating that:
"the individual substance, which is included in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else (substantia completa per se subsistens separata ab aliia);" (ST, Part III, Question 16, Art. 12, Reply to obj. 2).
The "per se subsistent" qualification plays a key part in the case of the Incarnation, while the "complete" qualification does so in the case of disembodied human souls.
The case of the Incarnation of the Logos
The problem posed by the Incarnation of the Logos is simple: why was NOT the "individual substance of a rational nature" of Jesus' Humanity a human person?
In this case, holding the real distinction between esse and essence allows a straightforward solution using the refined definition of person by St. Thomas Aquinas: the substance of Jesus' Humanity was not "per se subsistent", but existed by the Subsistent Act of Being of the Logos. That is, Christian doctrine of the Trinity states that each Divine Person is the Divine Essence. Thomism, in turn, affirms that the Divine Essence is the Subsistent Act of Being Itself (Ipsum Esse Subsistens), so that each Divine Person is the Subsistent Act of Being. Therefore, the assumption of a human nature by a Divine Person means that such human nature exists, from the moment of its creation, by the Subsistent Act of Being which that Divine Person eternally Is.
In contrast, denying the real distinction between esse and essence poses a serious problem, as in this case the human nature, or essence, of Jesus would have its own contingent act of being, i.e. would be "per se subsistent" as any other human nature. Why then would not be the "complete, per se subsistent, separate substance of a rational nature" of Jesus' Humanity a human person? To this problem, two solutions were proposed, by Suarez and Scotus:
Suarez: personhood is a "substantial mode" that presupposes the existence of a singular rational nature.
My objection: Suarez' "substantial mode" is not a "physical", as the scholastics would say, property of the person in question, with "physical" meaning "real and objectively present". It is just a spurious mental construct in the mind of the observer, and only if that observer actually believes in that "substantial mode".
Scotus: personhood is something negative, namely the negation of the hypostatic union in an existing singular rational nature.
My objection: this is just preposterous.
Therefore the unacceptable character of these proposed solutions argues, by reductio ad absurdum, for the real distinction between essence and esse. But there is a much stronger argument for that real distinction, namely the occasions in John's Gospel when Jesus said of Himself just "I Am", clearly in the same way as God (the Father) named Himself "I Am" ("Ehyeh") in Ex 3: 14.
"For if you do not believe that I Am, you will die in your sins." (Jn 8: 24b)
So Jesus said (to them), "When you lift up the Son of Man, then you will realize that I Am, and that I do nothing on my own, but I say only what the Father taught me." (Jn 8: 28)
Jesus said to them, "Amen, amen, I say to you, before Abraham came to be, I Am." (Jn 8: 58)
"From now on I am telling you before it happens, so that when it happens you may believe that I Am." (Jn 13: 19)
In all these passages, but particularly the third, it is completely clear that in Jesus there is only one Act of Being, the eternal, Subsistent Act of Being of the Word. Because otherwise He should have said "before Abraham came to be, I Am in my divine nature". Therefore his human essence does not exist by a created, contingent act of being, but by the Subsistent Act of Being of the Word.
This case, in which a created essence does not exist by its own contingent act of being, shows that there is a real distinction between essence and esse.
Turning now to the definition of person within the real distinction camp, there are basically two posibilities:
Cajetan, etc.: personhood is a "substantial mode" between "an individual substance of a rational nature" and esse.
Billot: personhood is the esse of "an individual substance of a rational nature".
I agree with Billot. The position of Cajetan, etc. suffers from exactly the same problem as that of Suarez. In other words, there are no persons without esse, either created, contingent esse or Uncreated, Subsistent Esse.
The case of disembodied human souls
After the statement that we quoted above, St. Thomas justifies the "complete" qualification in his further refinement of "individual substance" by observing that "otherwise, a man's hand might be called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless, because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a person;" (ST, Part III, Question 16, Art. 12, Reply to obj. 2).
A problem arises when this observation, which is clearly correct in the case of a hand, is applied to the human soul, as St. Thomas does in (ST, Part I, Question 75, Art. 4, Reply to obj. 2): "Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species."
To note, the latter passage is from an article that deals with the issue of whether the soul of a living man is that man. In this case we certainly share St. Thomas position, as a living man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. The problem comes when considering the condition of man after death and before the resurrection.
To state the problem in hylomorphic terms, even though it is clearly true, as St. Thomas states in the Answer of the last quoted article, that "in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter", this notion does not cover the case of a substantial form subsisting of itself separate from the matter it used to inform, as is the case of the human soul after death. This case is essentially different from that of a hand, or even from that of the whole human body, considered separate from the soul. This is because a body after death, i.e. after its separation from the soul, is no longer a human body. This is actually de fide Catholic doctrine, defined in the Ecumenical Council of Vienne (1311-1312): "the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is ... of itself and essentially the form of the human body."
Thus, as St. Thomas says in (ST, Part I, Question 76, Art. 8, Answer): "since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains its species, retains the action of the species." Therefore, just as a corpse is no longer a human body because it is no longer united to the soul, for the same reason a severed hand is no longer a human hand.
In contrast, the separate soul after death is still a human soul, as it retains the powers that have it as their subject, i.e. intelligence and will, as St. Thomas says in (ST, Part I, Question 77, Art. 8, Answer): "some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body." And as intelligence and will are the noblest powers of the human person, it is clearly true that, even within the Thomistic framework, the human soul after death is the same human person it was with the body, even though in a diminished state.
Thus, St. Thomas' refinement of the concept of "individual substance" in the Boethian definition of person quoted at the beginning of this article needs to be completed as:
"the individual substance, which is included in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else, or the substantial form of such a substance, when it is separated from the body to which it was originally united."
As in the case of the real distinction, the strongest argument for affirming that the human soul, when separated from the body after death, IS the same person it was with the living body, comes from words of Jesus. In this case, his words on the Cross to the crucified Good Thief:
"Truly, I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise." (Lk 23: 43)
Will a bold Thomist suggest that if Jesus had spoken strictly, He would have said "today your soul will be with me in Paradise" rather than "today you will be with me in Paradise"?
And just in case someone argues that speaking of "your soul" would have sounded extremely contrived in the concrete cultural environment of Palestine 30 AD, I call their attention to what Jesus had said to Peter, James and John just a few hours before in Gethsemane:
"My soul is deeply grieved to the point of death." (Mk 14: 34)
So, if Jesus had wanted to say "your soul will be with me in Paradise", He could have perfectly done it. But He did not. He said "YOU will be with me in Paradise".
As if this argument were not strong enough by itself, which in my view it clearly is, I submit another which is relevant for Roman Catholics only: the "Letter on certain questions regarding Eschatology" issued by the CDF on May 17, 1979. Quoting from it:
"The Church affirms that a spiritual element survives and subsists after death, an element endowed with consciousness and will, so that the "human self" subsists. To designate this element, the Church uses the word "soul", the accepted term in the usage of Scripture and Tradition."
Just in case someone objects that "self" does not mean "person", I will quote a key expression in other languages, noting that there was no Latin version of that Letter:
- so that the "human self" subsists.
- in modo tale che l'« io » umano sussista.
- de manera que subsiste el mismo « yo » humano.
- en sorte que le « moi » humain subsiste.
Clearly, the literal translation of the original expression in English should have been:
- so that the human « I » subsists.
Therefore, if the same « I » (or « me » in colloquial English) subsists after death, how can someone say that a disembodied soul is not a person?
