Real distinction between essence and esse from the definition of person and the Incarnation

Introduction

For some time, I was agnostic over the question of whether the distinction between essence and esse was real or just formal (defining that there is a real distinction between two things only if the things can be physically separated.) More precisely, I perceived that the question was based on differences in the definitions of both essence and esse. Consecuently, I perceived that either position could be held, of course not at the same time. The situation seemed analogous to that of Quantum Mechanics formalism, where Heisenberg's matrix mechanics and Schrödinger's wave mechanics are equivalent formalisms, in the sense that using either leads to the same result, though of course they cannot be used at the same time. Or to the situation of platonism and ante rem structuralism, in philosophy of mathematics.

That was so until I read an article about how to explain at a philosophical level why Jesus' human nature is not a human person, where the solutions presented by Scotus and Suarez, out of their rejection of the real distinction between essence and esse, seemed wholy unsatisfactory from the philosophical viewpoint. Which led me to the acceptance of said real distinction, in the process that I describe below, starting with the definition of person.

Definition of person

Adopting the definition of person by Boethius: "an individual substance of a rational nature", St. Thomas Aquinas refines it by stating that:

"the individual substance, which is included in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else (substantia completa per se subsistens separata ab aliia);" (ST, Part III, Question 16, Art. 12, Reply to obj. 2).

The "per se subsistent" qualification plays a key part in the case of the Incarnation, while the "complete" qualification does so in the case of disembodied human souls.

The case of the Incarnation of the Logos

The problem posed by the Incarnation of the Logos is simple: why was NOT the "individual substance of a rational nature" of Jesus' Humanity a human person?

In this case, holding the real distinction between esse and essence allows a straightforward solution using the refined definition of person by St. Thomas Aquinas: the substance of Jesus' Humanity was not "per se subsistent", but existed by the Subsistent Act of Being of the Logos.  That is, Christian doctrine of the Trinity states that each Divine Person is the Divine Essence.  Thomism, in turn, affirms that the Divine Essence is the Subsistent Act of Being Itself (Ipsum Esse Subsistens), so that each Divine Person is the Subsistent Act of Being.  Therefore, the assumption of a human nature by a Divine Person means that such human nature exists, from the moment of its creation, by the Subsistent Act of Being which that Divine Person eternally Is.

In contrast, denying the real distinction between esse and essence poses a serious problem, as in this case the human nature, or essence, of Jesus would have its own contingent act of being, i.e. would be "per se subsistent" as any other human nature.  Why then would not be the "complete, per se subsistent, separate substance of a rational nature" of Jesus' Humanity a human person?  To this problem, two solutions were proposed, by Suarez and Scotus:

Suarez: personhood is a "substantial mode" that presupposes the existence of a singular rational nature.

My objection: Suarez' "substantial mode" is not a "physical", as the scholastics would say, property of the person in question, with "physical" meaning "real and objectively present". It is just a spurious mental construct in the mind of the observer, and only if that observer actually believes in that "substantial mode".

Scotus: personhood is something negative, namely the negation of the hypostatic union in an existing singular rational nature.

My objection: this is just preposterous.

Therefore the unacceptable character of these proposed solutions argues, by reductio ad absurdum, for the real distinction between essence and esse. But there is a much stronger argument for that real distinction, namely the occasions in John's Gospel when Jesus said of Himself just "I Am", clearly in the same way as God (the Father) named Himself "I Am" ("Ehyeh") in Ex 3: 14.

"For if you do not believe that I Am, you will die in your sins." (Jn 8: 24b)

So Jesus said (to them), "When you lift up the Son of Man, then you will realize that I Am, and that I do nothing on my own, but I say only what the Father taught me." (Jn 8: 28)

Jesus said to them, "Amen, amen, I say to you, before Abraham came to be, I Am." (Jn 8: 58)

"From now on I am telling you before it happens, so that when it happens you may believe that I Am." (Jn 13: 19)

In all these passages, but particularly the third, it is completely clear that in Jesus there is only one Act of Being, the eternal, Subsistent Act of Being of the Word. Because otherwise He should have said "before Abraham came to be, I Am in my divine nature".  Therefore his human essence does not exist by a created, contingent act of being, but by the Subsistent Act of Being of the Word.

This case, in which a created essence does not exist by its own contingent act of being, shows that there is a real distinction between essence and esse.


Turning now to the definition of person within the real distinction camp, there are basically two posibilities:

Cajetan, etc.: personhood is a "substantial mode" between "an individual substance of a rational nature" and esse.

Billot: personhood is the esse of "an individual substance of a rational nature".

I agree with Billot.  The position of Cajetan, etc. suffers from exactly the same problem as that of Suarez.  In other words, there are no persons without esse, either created, contingent esse or Uncreated, Subsistent Esse.


The case of disembodied human souls

After the statement that we quoted above, St. Thomas justifies the "complete" qualification in his further refinement of "individual substance" by observing that "otherwise, a man's hand might be called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless, because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a person;" (ST, Part III, Question 16, Art. 12, Reply to obj. 2).

A problem arises when this observation, which is clearly correct in the case of a hand, is applied to the human soul, as St. Thomas does in (ST, Part I, Question 75, Art. 4, Reply to obj. 2): "Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species."

To note, the latter passage is from an article that deals with the issue of whether the soul of a living man is that man.  In this case we certainly share St. Thomas position, as a living man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body.  The problem comes when considering the condition of man after death and before the resurrection.

To state the problem in hylomorphic terms, even though it is clearly true, as St. Thomas states in the Answer of the last quoted article, that "in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter", this notion does not cover the case of a substantial form subsisting of itself separate from the matter it used to inform, as is the case of the human soul after death.  This case is essentially different from that of a hand, or even from that of the whole human body, considered separate from the soul.  This is because a body after death, i.e. after its separation from the soul, is no longer a human body.  This is actually de fide Catholic doctrine, defined in the Ecumenical Council of Vienne (1311-1312): "the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is ... of itself and essentially the form of the human body."

Thus, as St. Thomas says in (ST, Part I, Question 76, Art. 8, Answer): "since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains its species, retains the action of the species."  Therefore, just as a corpse is no longer a human body because it is no longer united to the soul, for the same reason a severed hand is no longer a human hand. 

In contrast, the separate soul after death is still a human soul, as it retains the powers that have it as their subject, i.e. intelligence and will, as St. Thomas says in (ST, Part I, Question 77, Art. 8, Answer): "some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body." And as intelligence and will are the noblest powers of the human person, it is clearly true that, even within the Thomistic framework, the human soul after death is the same human person it was with the body, even though in a diminished state.

Thus, St. Thomas' refinement of the concept of "individual substance" in the Boethian definition of person quoted at the beginning of this article needs to be completed as:

"the individual substance, which is included in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else, or the substantial form of such a substance, when it is separated from the body to which it was originally united."

As in the case of the real distinction, the strongest argument for affirming that the human soul, when separated from the body after death, IS the same person it was with the living body, comes from words of Jesus. In this case, his words on the Cross to the crucified Good Thief:

"Truly, I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise." (Lk 23: 43)

Will a bold Thomist suggest that if Jesus had spoken strictly, He would have said "today your soul will be with me in Paradise" rather than "today you will be with me in Paradise"?

And just in case someone argues that speaking of "your soul" would have sounded extremely contrived in the concrete cultural environment of Palestine 30 AD, I call their attention to what Jesus had said to Peter, James and John just a few hours before in Gethsemane:

"My soul is deeply grieved to the point of death." (Mk 14: 34)

So, if Jesus had wanted to say "your soul will be with me in Paradise", He could have perfectly done it. But He did not. He said "YOU will be with me in Paradise".

As if this argument were not strong enough by itself, which in my view it clearly is, I submit another which is relevant for Roman Catholics only: the "Letter on certain questions regarding Eschatology" issued by the CDF on May 17, 1979.  Quoting from it:

"The Church affirms that a spiritual element survives and subsists after death, an element endowed with consciousness and will, so that the "human self" subsists. To designate this element, the Church uses the word "soul", the accepted term in the usage of Scripture and Tradition."

Just in case someone objects that "self" does not mean "person", I will quote a key expression in other languages, noting that there was no Latin version of that Letter:

- so that the "human self" subsists.

- in modo tale che l'« io » umano sussista.

- de manera que subsiste el mismo « yo » humano.

 - en sorte que le « moi » humain subsiste.

 Clearly, the literal translation of the original expression in English should have been:

- so that the human « I » subsists.

 Therefore, if the same « I » (or « me » in colloquial English) subsists after death, how can someone say that a disembodied soul is not a person?

A look at the body-soul relationship and the notion of "corpus purus"

This article was originally written in June 2013.

In this article I will look at some issues regarding the nature and creation of man itself, a creation that is both evolutionary as it refers to the body and by way of direct divine intervention as it refers to the spiritual soul.  This last statement clearly reflects a specific notion of the nature of human soul, a notion which is in accordance with the Magisterium of the Catholic Church.  A good review of historic and current positions on this subject is in [1].  For this article, I will only consider two positions:

For animals, including hominins right up to the moment of man's creation, Mario Bunge's emergentist materialism, which is monistic with respect to substance.  While this use of Bunge's position was not what he had in mind, since he focused on the human mind, he would probably agree that it also applies to the far more primitive animal psyche. And on the Catholic side, even the most traditional neo-scholastic thomist would concede that emergentist materialism correctly describes the nature of a chimpanzee or of any other animal (as in fact it agrees with the 14th of the famous 24 thomistic theses).

For humans, hylomorphic dualism, which posits that the human body is animated by a spiritual soul, so that spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.  Additionally, every spiritual soul is created immediately by God - it is not "produced" by the parents - and also is immortal: it does not perish when it separates from the body at death.  It is easily seen that this position reflects the orthodox doctrine of the Catholic Church, as the text has been directly copied from CCC # 364-366, (and it also agrees with the 15th of the famous 24 thomistic theses).

I directly discard the so-called "strong emergentism" of Ruiz de la Peña, which holds that the spiritual substance (not just faculties or properties) proceeds from matter by way of self-transcendence of the latter (el alma, "materia que se autotrasciende"), or, in words of Martínez Sierra, that the spiritual principle appears as a "blooming" ("efloración") of matter.  Because, while at first sight it is arguable whether spiritual properties such as intellect and free will can arise out of matter, it is plainly evident that a spiritual substance - much less one able to subsist after the dissolution of the body - cannot appear as a result of a process of self-transcendence of the material, nor can it "emanate" from other limited spirits, but can only be breathed from Above, i.e. created immediately by God.

Given the subject under study, it is mandatory to take into account this dogmatic definition of the Ecumenical Council of Vienne, decree 1:

"Moreover, with the approval of the said council, we reject as erroneous and contrary to the truth of the catholic faith every doctrine or proposition rashly asserting that the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form of the human body, or casting doubt on this matter. In order that all may know the truth of the faith in its purity and all error may be excluded, we define that anyone who presumes henceforth to assert defend or hold stubbornly that the rational or intellectual soul is not the form of the human body of itself and essentially, is to be considered a heretic."

Therefore I solemnly profess that the rational or intellectual soul is, of itself and essentially, the form of the human body.

Now I will perform a simple thought experiment that will show, among other things, the importance of emphasizing "human" as adjective of "body" in the above statement.

Focusing now on an the case of an animal, as I said before it is clear that its nature is correctly described by Bunge's emergentist materialism, so that we can combine the concepts from this theory with those from thomism and state that the sensitive soul which is the substantial form of the animal is an emergent property of the matter of its body, just as the vegetative soul which is the substantial form of a plant is an emergent property of the matter of the plant's body.  It is important to note that an animal has only one soul, the sensitive, which includes the powers of the nutritive or vegetative soul of a plant.  In Aquinas' terms, the sensitive soul, being a higher form, contains virtually the nutritive soul, so that itself alone does whatever the lower form does in plants (ST Ia.76.4 & 76.6.ad 1).  From the perspective of emergentist materialism this view is clearly correct: as a living being's substantial form is an emergent property of the matter of its body, each living being has only one substantial form which reflects the nature of its body, the higher the being the more functional the form.

Let's now go backward in time to the moment of the creation of human beings, when God infused a spiritual soul in two individuals, and from that time on, in their descendants.  But first a small digression: the specific time of the creation event, and the consequent particular species in the evolutionary line leading to Homo Sapiens on which that event occurred, is a debatable issue, so that one could in principle pick for biblical Adam any of those species that are unanimously considered by scholars to belong to the genus Homo [2], which I list below together with their estimated time of appearance and cranial capacity:

- Homo Ergaster (1.75 Ma, 850 cm^3). Colateral offspring: H. Erectus.

- Homo Antecessor (1 Ma, 1000 cm^3). Colateral offspring: H. Heidelbergensis and from that H. Neanderthalensis.

- Homo Rhodesiensis (0.6 Ma, 1300 cm^3).

- Homo Sapiens (0.2 Ma, 1450 cm^3).

Of these, Homo Sapiens is clearly the best choice for two reasons:

- It allows matching biblical Adam to Y-chromosomal Adam, who according to a current plausible estimation could have been contemporaneous with Mitochondrial Eve at precisely 0.2 Ma. [3]

- It allows matching the time of its appearance with the origin of language according to two recent studies [4] [5].

Back to the creation of human beings, at this point I need to use some notation and concepts that I introduce in the article "Creation of man. Concordance between science and Genesis account" in this blog. The notation is:

t-humans = true humans = theological humans = metaphysical humans = with an infused spiritual soul

q-humans = quasi humans = biologically identical to t-humans but without an infused spiritual soul

immediate-previous-hominins = individuals of the immediate ancestral species to q-humans/t-humans


Using that notation, there are two possible cases for the creation of the first two t-humans, Biblical Adam & Eve:

1U: Spiritual-only Upgrade

In this case q-humans were brought into existence by way of biological evolution. When there were at least several thousand q-humans around, God created Biblical Adam & Eve by infusing in two q-humans a spiritual soul, so that they were biologically identical to the surrounding q-humans, differing only by having been infused a spiritual soul.

2U: Physical & Spiritual Upgrade

In this case there were no q-humans, and God created Biblical Adam & Eve by producing in two individuals engendered by immediate-previous-hominin parents both a physical and a spiritual "upgrade": at the biological level, at least a brain-enhancing macro-mutation, plus the infusion of a spiritual soul.

In either case, Biblical Adam & Eve are the only t-humans for which infusion of a spiritual soul could have occurred at any time after birth (and in my personal opinion, it probably occurred after they had become independent of their respective q- or immediate-previous-hominin parents). In the case of all their descendants, infusion of the soul took place at conception.

As described in the mentioned previous article "Creation of man:...", before the end of 2012, when then-current scientific data pointed to mitochondrial Eve having lived 30 ka earlier than Y-chromosomal Adam, creation case 1U and its associated assumption that q-humans were viable as animals was required for a conceptual framework consistent with both that timing discrepancy and the "historical Adam" position.  At the end of 2012 a new study was published that pushed back the estimated time of Y-chromosomal Adam, so that according to a plausible estimation he and mitochondrial Eve could have been contemporaneous. [3]  As a result, it is now possible to match current scientific data with the "historical Adam" position using either creation case.  Thus, there is no constraint from that side for favoring one position over the other.

Now, each case raises interesting issues related to both thomistic anthropology itself and the nature-grace controversy.  Let`s start with creation case 1U.  It is easily seen that it is based on two implicit assumptions:

Assumption 1: q-humans, i.e. beings organically identical to humans but without an infused spiritual soul, are viable as animals.  Of course they would not be able to do abstract thinking, have elaborate language, do art, practice agriculture, build cities, etc., but the point is that their having a highly complex central nervous system (CNS) did not cause them to just collapse, collectively or even individually, because of their lack of a spiritual soul.  I call this assumption the "corpus purus" hypothesis, as it is analogous to the "natura pura" hypothesis.

The denial of this assumption has a major implication: that an animal with a complex enough CNS rigorously requires being infused a spiritual soul to be viable even at the animal level, or, paraphrasing Pius X's Pascendi Dominici Gregis 37, "that there is in a sufficiently neurologically developed animal nature a true and rigorous necessity with regard to a spiritual soul – and not merely a capacity and a suitability for a spiritual soul".  We can see that this position is an exact analog of Lubacian intrinsicism, replacing:

sufficiently neurologically developed animal nature -> human nature

spiritual soul -> supernatural order.

Thus, if the opposite to the "corpus purus" hypothesis was the actual case, it could be viewed as a hint that God proceeded in the same way regarding human nature and the supernatural order, i.e. as described by Lubacian intrinsicism.

Assumption 2: it is perfectly compatible with God's infinite goodness not to infuse a spiritual soul to an animal that has a capacity and a suitability for it.

The denial of this assumption is indirectly related to the nature-grace controversy, in the sense that, if it is unbecoming to God not to infuse a spiritual soul to an animal that has a capacity and a suitability for it, it is also unbecoming to God not to elevate to participation in the divine nature a rational being that has a capacity and a suitability for it.

Regarding thomistic anthropology, it is important to note that, in creation case 1U, the existing q-humans before creation, being animals and not true humans, had as the substantial form of their bodies a sensitive soul that was an emergent property of the matter of their bodies.  In the case of biblical Adam and Eve, after they were created humans they had as the substantial form of their bodies their spiritual soul, as defined by the Council of Vienne.  But St Thomas Aquinas goes further by stating consistently that the infusion of the spiritual soul causes the previous sensitive soul to "perish", "be removed", "be corrupted", "fade away". (SCG II.89.11; ST Ia.76.3.ad 3; ST Ia.118.2.ad 2; QD de potentia III.9.ad 9; QD de spiritualibus creaturis III.ad 13; QD de anima XI.ad 1; CT 92)

Now, given that in case 1U the creation of Adam and Eve consisted just in infusing them a spiritual soul without making any physical modification in their bodies, how could it be that, according to thomistic anthropology, their bodies were no longer producing a sensitive soul? There are two possible solutions to this problem:

One possibility (b) is that creation case 1U is not viable, so that we have to turn to creation case 2U, which does not depend on either of those assumptions for its viability, although it is compatible with them.  In this case, a macro-mutation simultaneous to the infusion of the spiritual soul changed the working mode of the brain so that it was prepared to work under the spiritual soul.

Another possibility (a) comes from a more refined understanding of the position of St Thomas in relation to emergent materialism: the "sensitive soul" is not intrinsically identical with "the sensitive layer of emergent properties of matter" but a possible role of it, so that:

- when there is no spiritual soul, "the sensitive layer of emergent properties of matter" acts as an "end point" and therefore a "sensitive soul".

- when there is a spiritual soul, "the sensitive layer of emergent properties of matter" acts as an "intermediate layer" which is no longer a "sensitive soul".

Thus the infusion of the spiritual soul does not cause the removal or corruption of the emergent properties of the brain, but a change of their role, so that they now become part of the aristotelian "matter" for which the spiritual soul is the "substantial form". I.e. the "human body" in the definition of Vienne is not just its constituent matter (in the modern sense, i.e. molecules) but organized matter plus its emergent properties. 

This is most easily visualized using the conceptual model of a layered system, such as those used in communications (like the OSI model) and computer systems.  In this model, the spiritual soul is a new higher layer that does not replace the sensitive layer but "plugs onto it from above".  A simple analogy would be the spiritual soul being the operating system and the sensitive layer the firmware, (or the BIOS when the operating system was old MS-DOS, because modern operating systems do not use the BIOS so that their case would be analogous to the thomistic position).  To note, the lower interface of the human spiritual soul, its capability to bind to the upper interface of the sensitive layer of a complex body, its "unitability" in Bonaventura's term, differentiates it from a pure spirit.

Now, in this analogy it is clear that the mode of operation of the sensitive layer is essentially different before and after the infusion of the spiritual soul.  Before the infusion it is an "end point" which receives "input" (sense data, etc.) from the body, performs some elementary processing of the data and generates "output" to the body (movements, etc.).  After the infusion, in contrast, it passes most sense input "upstream" through its upper interface to the spiritual soul (some sense input is probably still processed by the sensitive layer, like reflexes), and it is now the spiritual soul that processes the data in a much more advanced fashion and generates the "output" that is passed "downstream" to the sensitive layer. 

Thus there are two possible options:

a. The infusion of the spiritual soul is enough to make the brain switch its working mode so that its emergent properties are no longer an end-point ("a sensitive soul") but an intermediate layer.  In this option, creation case 1U was possible and "corpus purus" is a hypothetical possibility and it was actually the case before creation.

b. The brain itself must be created in such a way that it is ready to work as an intermediate layer beneath the spiritual soul, with the result that its emergent sensitive layer can no longer work in a stand-alone "end point" mode.  In this option, creation case 1U was not possible and "corpus purus" is not a hypothetical possibility.  Also, this option is conceptually analogous to de Lubac's intrinsicist position.


References:

[1] Amo Usanos 2007. "El principio vital del ser humano en Ireneo, Orígenes, Agustín, Tomás de Aquino y la antropología teológica española reciente". Tesi Gregoriana, Serie Teologia, 148. Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana. Roma, Italia.
http://books.google.com/books?id=37KZmAUcDysC

[2] Wood & Collard 2001. "The meaning of Homo".
http://www.gwu.edu/~hogwash/BW_PDFs/RP131.pdf

[3] Wilson Sayres 2013. "Timing of ancient human Y lineage depends on the mutation rate: A comment on Mendez et al".
http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.6098

[4] Nichols 1998. "The origin and dispersal of languages: Linguistic evidence". In Jablonski, N.G. and Aiello, L.E., eds. 1998. "The Origin and Diversification of Language", pp. 127-70. (Memoirs of the California Academy of Sciences, 24.) San Francisco: California Academy of Sciences.

[5] Perreault & Mathew 2012. "Dating the Origin of Language Using Phonemic Diversity".
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3338724/

An unconventional look at the nature-grace controversy

1. Introduction

This article deals with an intra-Catholic subject: the debate on the relationship of nature and grace between the "integralist" view that Henri de Lubac presented in his 1946 book "Surnaturel" and the view of the thomist commentatorial tradition, a view dubbed "extrinsicist" by de Lubac and which I will call "traditional".  To note, the traditional view has been repeatedly endorsed by papal magisterium as the only position that is compatible with the gratuity of the supernatural order, i.e. with the double gratuity of grace [1].

If someone arriving at this article is not familiar with the subject but would like to learn about it, I suggest reading [2].

In this article I present a new perspective in which to look at the issue, which opens the possibility that a version of de Lubac's integralism MIGHT be compatible in the general case with the gratuity of the supernatural order, i.e. with the double gratuity of grace.


2. Possible creation cases

This new perspective is based on considering the two hypothetical possibilities for the logical sequence of divine decisions related to the creation of a rational being and its possible elevation to participation in the divine nature.  For this logical sequence, there are two possible cases:

Logical Sequence 1 (LS1): antecedent, or initial, definition of nature's specifics

Logical Sequence 2 (LS2): subsequent, or deferred, definition of nature's specifics

where

- "antecedent" and "subsequent" are with respect to the free divine decision to raise the nature in question to participation in the divine nature and subsequent attainment of the Beatific Vision, and

- "antecedent", "subsequent", "initial", "deferred", and the numbered steps below, are to be understood in terms of logical, not temporal sequence.

Logical Sequence 1 (LS1)

1. God freely decides to create a species of beings with rational nature and at that point defines all the nature's specifics. (gratuity of nature).

2. God freely decides whether to raise those beings to participation in the divine life. (double gratuity of grace, if the decision is in the affirmative, an option that we will call LS1.1)

In this case, between logical steps 1 and 2 [3], IF those rational beings, whose nature has already [3] been fully defined in step 1, did not have everlasting natural happiness or natural beatitude as their natural end, but would be forever frustrated or unhappy without attaining the Beatific Vision, THEN the elevation to participation in the divine life ("grace") would not be doubly gratuitous but would be owed to them for the fulfillment of their nature, and therefore God would not be free to decide in step 2 whether to raise them to participation in the divine life, as it would not be in accordance to his absolute goodness to create beings that could not, without fault on their part, fulfill their nature.

Therefore, if all the specifics of a rational nature are antecedently or initially defined, then the simultaneous affirmation of the double gratuity of grace and divine goodness requires that such rational nature has a natural end of everlasting natural happiness or natural beatitude, which is the traditional view.

Logical Sequence 2, option 1 (LS2.1)

1. God freely decides to create a species of beings with rational nature WITHOUT defining at that point all the nature's specifics. (gratuity of nature)

2. God freely decides to raise those beings to participation in the divine life. (double gratuity of grace)

3. God now [3] freely decides whether those beings will (subcase LS2.1.1), or will not (subcase LS2.1.2), have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, as either option would be in accordance to his absolute goodness, GIVEN the free decision that has already [3] been taken to raise them to participation in the divine life.

Thus, subcase LS2.1.2 is a version of de Lubac's integralist position that is compatible with the double gratuity of grace, provided that LS2:

- makes philosophical and theological sense in itself, and
- is compatible with the underlying actual ontological case (as we will see below).

There is a possible variant of LS2, which I call LS2', defined by discarding subcase LS2.1.1 due to the fact that it is intrisically impossible because of assumed ontological constraints. This means that, if God freely decides to raise a species of rational beings to participation in the divine life, then He cannot decide that those beings will have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness. This would be the case if, and only if, capacity (obediential potency) for the supernatural implies necessity for it. To note, this is the actual version of de Lubac's position after Humani Generis.

Therefore, whereas with LS2, which is based on an assumption of intrinsically possible ontological cases (as we will see below), de Lubac's integralism is a possibility with the elevation to the supernatural, with LS2', which is based on a different assumption of intrinsically possible ontological cases, de Lubac's integralism is a necessity with the elevation to the supernatural.

Logical Sequence 2, option 2 (LS2.2)

1. God freely decides to create a species of beings with rational nature WITHOUT defining at that point all the nature's specifics. (gratuity of nature)

2. God freely decides not to raise those beings to participation in the divine life.

3. God now [3] can only decide, in accordance to his absolute goodness, that those beings will have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness.

Clearly this subcase applies also to case LS2'.


3. Ontological constraints

3.1. Preliminary considerations

It is readily seen that it is necessary to consider whether there are ontological constraints in play that render some of the creation cases impossible. Because, taking LS1 as an example, if God freely decides to create a species of triangular beings, then God cannot freely decide whether those triangular beings will have three or four sides.

One of the possible constraints is if a rational nature that has been given the capacity and suitability to be raised to participation in the divine life and subsequent attainment of the Beatific Vision (in short "the supernatural"), has as a result a rigorous necessity for the supernatural in order to achieve true happiness.

It is critical to note that true happiness is not the same as ultimate happiness.  Nobody discusses that the Beatific Vision is the only possible ultimate happiness.  What is in question is whether a created rational being can be truly happy in an everlasting state consistent with his nature as created, contingent being, i.e. an unending transit from potency to act, an unending development.  That such a state is a valid theoretical possibility was the position held by Spanish theologian Juan Alfaro (1914-1993) [4] [5], whose concept of "obediential potency" is a kind of "via media" between the "absolute desire" of de Lubac and the mere "non repugnance" of Cajetan and Garrigou-Lagrange.

I add that such state of natural happiness should necessarily include freedom from evil and risk of evil of any kind, both that which can come from ouside and that which can come from within, as it is hard to see how there can be true happiness when one is still able to screw things up. This consideration is in line with Lk 16:22-26 - if "Abraham's bosom" in that passage is interpreted literally as referring to the "Limbo of the fathers", which was a state of natural happiness, and not alegorically as referring to the Beatific Vision - as Abraham tells the damned rich that "between us and you a great chasm is established to prevent anyone from crossing who might wish to go from our side to yours".


3.2. Study of possible ontological cases

Below I list all the possible ontological cases, where each case comprises a number of possible combinations of capacity (in the sense of "obediential potency" in which Pius X used the term in Pascendi Dominici Gregis, 37) and necessity for the supernatural in created rational beings.

Ontological Case 1 (OC1): capacity and necessity are always present.

OC1: capacity, necessity

This was the position originally presented by de Lubac in Surnaturel (1946) and rejected by Pius XII in Humani Generis (1950). As we will see, it is intrinsically not compatible with any creation case.

Ontological Case 2 (OC2): capacity is always present, but it does not imply necessity.

2.1: capacity, necessity
2.2: capacity, no necessity

Ontological Case 3 (OC3): capacity is always present; there is never necessity.

OC3: capacity, no necessity

This is the traditional position. Also, Alfaro in [4.b] argues convincingly that this is the actual case.

Ontological Case 4 (OC4): capacity is optional, but if present it implies necessity.

4.1: capacity, necessity
4.2: no capacity, no necessity

This was the position subsequently adopted by de Lubac after Humani Generis.

Ontological Case 5 (OC5): capacity is optional, and if present it does not imply necessity.

5.1: capacity, necessity
5.2: capacity, no necessity
5.3: no capacity, no necessity

Ontological Case 6 (OC6): capacity is optional; there is never necessity.

6.1: capacity, no necessity
6.2: no capacity, no necessity

We can now study the compatibility between creation cases and OCs. A creation case is compatible with an OC if and only if, for each possible logical sequence of the creation case, there is at least one compatible subcase of the OC.  If, additionally, all of the ontological subcases are compatible with a logical sequence of the creation case, the creation case is said to be exhaustively compatible with the OC.


LS1.1: compatible with all OC's in which there is capacity but not necessity: 2.2, 3, 5.2, 6.1.

LS1.2: compatible with all OC's in which there is no necessity: 2.2, 3, 4.2, 5.2, 5.3, 6.1, 6.2.

Thus LS1 is compatible with OC2, OC3, OC5 and OC6, and exhaustively compatible with OC3 and OC6.


LS2.1.1: compatible with all OC's in which there is capacity but not necessity: 2.2, 3, 5.2, 6.1.

LS2.1.2: compatible with all OC's in which there is capacity and necessity: 1, 2.1, 4.1, 5.1.

LS2.2: compatible with all OC's in which there is no necessity: 2.2, 3, 4.2, 5.2, 5.3, 6.1, 6.2.

Thus LS2 is compatible with OC2 and OC5, and also exhaustively compatible with them.


As said before, there is a possible variant of LS2, which I call LS2', defined by discarding subcase LS2.1.1.  This means that, if God freely decides to raise a species of rational beings to participation in the divine life, then He cannot decide that those beings will have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness. This would be the case if, and only if, capacity (obediential potency) for the supernatural implies necessity for it, i.e. if, and only if, "intrinsically possible" reality is as described by OC4.  Therefore, by definition LS2' is compatible only with OC4, and it is also exhaustively compatible with it.


It is important to note that this consideration of ontological cases is based on the assumption that there are characteristics or combinations of characteristics of created rational beings that are intrinsically impossible, like a triangle having four sides. Therefore the case is not that God can choose which OC describes reality. Rather, the actual OC that describes reality, i.e. the combination of intrinsically possible ontological subcases, is a given, and God can accordingly proceed with a suitable LS. In other words, in reality it is the actual OC that constrains which LS can be followed by God in the creation process, so that the valid options are:

OC2: LS1, LS2
OC3: LS1
OC4: LS2'
OC5: LS1, LS2
OC6: LS1

Thus, if "intrinsically possible" reality is as described by:

- OC3 or OC6, then the traditional view is the only possible one,
- OC4, then de Lubac's intrinsicist view is the only possible one,
- OC2 or OC5, then both the traditional and the intrinsicist views are possible.


4. Potentially related pauline passage: Rom 8:29

"For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, so that He might be the firstborn among many brothers."

At first reading, this passage lends support to case LS1 and consequently to the traditional position, since the natural way to understand that "God foreknew someone" is that God knew that person in an exact and complete way, and not in a fuzzy or incomplete way.

However, still taking this verse in isolation, "those whom He foreknew" can be interpreted as referring to:

- the universal predestination to be potentially raised to participation in the divine life, or

- the selective predestination to be actually raised to participation in the divine life.

Clearly only the first interpretation, which encompasses all members of the species, is related to the subject in consideration, so that the passage can be invoked to support case LS1. To choose between both interpretations, we must look at the next verse, Rom 8:30:

"And these whom He predestined, He also called; and these whom He called, He also justified; and these whom He justified, He also glorified."

Here the addition of "justified" and "glorified" supports the second interpretation, viz. that the predestination in the previous verse does not refer to the divine design over the entire human species to be potentially raised to participation in the divine life but only to the predestination of those who would be actually raised to participation in the divine life (a predestination that includes the free human response to God's call).


5. Related magisterial statements

Quoting from [1]:

In 1567 Pope St. Pius V condemned Baius’s claim that “The sublimation of human nature and its elevation to participation in the divine nature was due to the integrity of the human being in its first state, and is therefore to be called natural, not supernatural.” (DS 1921)

And Pope Clement XI later condemned the following Jansenist position taught by Quesnel, “The grace of Adam is a consequence of creation and was due to his whole and sound nature.” (DS 2345)

And Pope Pius VI also condemned this position in the bull Auctorem fidei, in which he wrote, “The doctrine of the [Jansenist] synod about the state of happy innocence … insofar … as it intimates that that state was a consequence of creation, due to man from the natural exigency and condition of human nature, not a gratuitous gift of God, is false, elsewhere condemned in Baius and in Quesnel, erroneous, favorable to the Pelagian heresy.” (DS 2616)

Concerning the error of modernism, Pope Pius X wrote: "There is no question now of the old error, by which a sort of right to the supernatural order was claimed for the human nature.
...
And here We cannot but deplore once more, and grievously, that there are Catholics who, while rejecting immanence as a doctrine, employ it as a method of apologetics, and who do this so imprudently that they seem to admit that there is in human nature a true and rigorous necessity with regard to the supernatural order – and not merely a capacity and a suitability for the supernatural, such as has at all times been emphasized by Catholic apologists." (Pascendi Dominici Gregis, 37)

Finally, Pius XII wrote in an encyclical in 1950, four years after the publishing of de Lubac's Surnaturel:

"Others destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision." (Humani Generis, 26)

The last part of Pius XII's statement was easily complied with by de Lubac, by switching from OC1 to OC4.  That modification, though, did not change the situation regarding man, to which all the other quoted statements from former popes referred.

The three statements including "due to" might be solved by a Lubacian by arguing that, since the logical sequence in the creation of man was according to case LS2.1.2, the "due to" consideration does not apply: God freely decided to raise humans to participation in the divine life (double gratuity of grace) and subsequently, or consequently in case LS2'.1.2, decided that they would not have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness.  On the other hand, the objection in the last paragraph of Pascendi regarding the "true and rigorous necessity" will still and always stand.

To this Lubacian argument it could be objected, however, that in subcase LS2.1.2 or LS2'.1.2 the double gratuity of grace is evident only from God's viewpoint and not from the creatures' viewpoint.  Because if the creatures take as a valid starting point for reasoning their own nature, and assuming that they have realized by means of philosophical reflection that they do not have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, they will come to the legitimate conclusion that participation in the divine life is due to their nature for its fulfillment. Thus, without an explicit divine revelation that case LS2 or LS2' was the actual way in which God proceeded when creating them, a revelation that did not take place in actual human history, the creatures, and specifically human beings, would be holding, wholly legitimately from their epistemic viewpoint, the propositions condemned by the Popes above. Which proves that integralism plus creation subcases LS2.1.2 or LS2'.1.2 cannot be the actual case for human beings.


6. A surprising unavoidable solution if the epistemic uncertainty on the subject is unacceptable

Finally I present a logical reasoning which shows that, if it is necessary for our salvation that we know for certain whether we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, then integralism cannot be true in the concrete case of human beings. Ironically, this is the exact reverse of de Lubac's position that extrinsicism was theoretically possible in the general case but was not true in the concrete case of human beings.

In the following reasoning the terms "creation", "created" and "creating" are used in an extended sense to mean all logical steps in cases LS1 or LS2.

a. A creature cannot possibly discern philosophically whether the divine decision process involved in their creation was actually according to case LS1 or LS2.  Rather, the only way they could know that would be via divine revelation.

b. From a and the fact that the divine revelation that took place in actual human history says only that God freely decided to raise human beings to participation in the divine nature, it follows that there is no way at all for human beings ("we" / "us") to know whether we have been created according to case LS1.1 or LS2.1.

c. From the conclusion of b and the fact that God has revealed to us everything we need to know for our salvation, it follows that we do not need to know for our salvation whether we have been created according to case LS1.1 or LS2.1.

d. From the conclusion of c and the fact that for our salvation we need to know with certainty that God acts with both infinite freedom and goodness, it follows that whether we have been created according to case LS1.1 or LS2.1 is irrelevant to our knowing that God has acted with both infinite freedom and goodness when creating us.

e. From the conclusion of c and the fact that for our salvation we need to have some knowledge of ourselves, which includes the knowledge of whether we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, it follows that whether we have been created according to case LS1.1 or LS2.1 is irrelevant to our knowing whether we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness.

f. From the conclusions of d and e and the fact that in case LS1 the simultaneous affirmation of divine freedom and goodness requires that the rational nature in question has a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, it follows that, in the case of human beings, this must also be true in case LS2.1, which means that if LS2.1 was the actual case in the creation of human beings, then it was in the form of subcase LS2.1.1.

In other words, the only way in which the humanly insoluble epistemic dilemma between cases LS1.1 and LS2.1 may be irrelevant to our knowing whether we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness is that, if LS2.1 was the actual case in the creation of human beings, then it was in the form of subcase LS2.1.1.  Thus, whether the actual case was LS1.1 or LS2.1.1, we know that we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness and that God has acted with both infinite freedom and goodness when creating us.

As this conclusion is based on the assumption in step e that it is necessary for our salvation that we know whether we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, the situation is quite interesting:
- if we need to know whether we have a natural end, then we know that we have it,
- if we don't need to know, then we don't know whether we have it.

Of course a Lubacian would say that the correct reasoning should proceed the other way: it is the knowledge from Revelation and the Fathers (as interpreted by Lubacians) that we do not have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness which allows us to solve the dilemma between cases LS1.1 and LS2.1 in favor of the latter, specifically in the flavor of LS2.1.2, actually LS2'.1.2. 


7. A thought experiment: analogy with the creation of life

In order to make an analogy with the nature-grace issue, we can simplify the process of creation of life into two steps, which are listed below together with their respective enabling conditions and the analogous steps in the creation/elevation of rational beings:

- creation of life enabled by abundance of Carbon / creation of a species of rational beings (nature)

- creation of complex aerobic life enabled by abundance of atmospheric O2 / elevation of rational beings to participation in divine life (grace)

We can now try to describe the logical sequence of divine decisions related to the creation of life according to LS1 and LS2.

According to LS1:

1. God freely decides to create a species of living beings and at that point defines all the nature's specifics. (gratuity of nature and Carbon)

Thus God decides right in step 1 whether those beings will be complex obligate aerobes, simple facultative aerobes, or simple anaerobes, though He actually cannot choose the first option if we want step 2 to be analogous to that of the creation and elevation of rational beings:

2. God freely decides whether those beings will use O2 (double gratuity of O2).

Clearly for God to be free to decide in step 2 whether those beings will use O2, they cannot be obligate aerobes.

Therefore, since all complex life forms are obligate aerobes, their creation process cannot be described using LS1 in an analogous way to the creation and potential elevation of rational beings.

To this observation, a defender of the traditional view can reply that that incompatibility is not significant for a simple reason: the underlying analogy (basic life enabled by Carbon - aerobic life enabled by O2 / nature - grace) is not valid, because the nature of all life forms, and specifically of complex aerobic life forms, is a unified whole, enabled in this case by (Carbon + O2), so that having a separate second step in which God decides whether those beings will use O2 does not make sense. Rather, when God defines all the nature's specifics in step 1, He decides that they will be complex aerobic beings and as a consequence need O2.

According to LS2:

1. God freely decides to create a species of living beings WITHOUT defining at that point all the nature's specifics, and for that provides an abundance of Carbon. (gratuity of basic life and enabling Carbon)

2. God freely decides that those those beings will have a complex aerobic form, and for that provides an abundance of atmospheric O2 (double gratuity of complex aerobic life and enabling O2)

3. God now freely decides whether those beings will (subcase LS2.1.1), or will not (subcase LS2.1.2), have the possibility of functioning without O2 in a more elementary way, as either option would be in accordance to his absolute goodness, GIVEN the free decision that has already been taken to provide them with abundant O2.

Actually, in the physical realm the analogy with de Lubac's view would be complete, as subcase LS2.1.1 is intrisically impossible because of physical constraints: within the laws that God set in the universe, if God freely decides to give a species of living beings a COMPLEX aerobic form, then He cannot decide that those beings will have the possibility of functioning without O2 in a more elementary way. (There are simple life forms that can function with or without O2, i.e. that are facultative aerobes, but all complex life forms are obligate aerobes: they are enabled by O2 and rigorously need it.)

To this observation, a defender of the traditional view can simply reply that the very concept of LS2 does not make any sense at all, as step 1 is equivalent to God saying:

1. "Let's create a species that will live in the northern latitudes, and let's leave for later the decision of whether it will be a microbe or a woolly massive mammal with a trunk and big tusks. For that, at this stage I need to provide Carbon. Done."

And besides, there is no reason why the laws in the physical realm that mandate that [all complex life forms are enabled by O2 and rigorously need it] would have a correlate of laws in the realm of rational beings that mandate that [all rational beings that have an obediential potency for the supernatural rigorously need it.]


References and notes:

[1] A very good summary of papal statements on the issue was provided by Dr Bryan Cross as comment #79, dated December 30th, 2011, under his article:
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2011/09/nature-grace-and-mans-supernatural-end-feingold-kline-and-clark/

[2] Mulcahy, Matthew Bernard 2008. "Not Everything Is Grace: Aquinas’s notion of “pure nature” and the Christian integralism of Henri de Lubac and of radical orthodoxy"
http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/digitaltheses/public/adt-acuvp238.11012011/index.html

[3] As I said, "between steps 1 and 2", "already" and "now" are to be understood in terms of logical, not temporal sequence.

[4] Works by Juan Alfaro dealing with the issue of nature and grace:

[4.a] Alfaro 1952. "Lo natural y lo sobrenatural: estudio histórico desde Santo Tomás hasta Cayetano (1274-1534)". Madrid.

[4.b] Alfaro 1957. "Trascendencia e inmanencia de lo sobrenatural". Gregorianum Vol. 38, p. 5-50.
http://books.google.com/books?id=XsnS9PibDQIC

[4.c] Alfaro 1972. "Naturaleza y gracia" in "Sacramentum Mundi: enciclopedia teológica" paragraph 4.
http://mercaba.org/Mundi/4/naturaleza_y_gracia.htm

[4.d] Alfaro 1973. "Cristología y antropología: temas teológicos actuales". Ediciones Cristiandad. Madrid.

[5] Coverage by other authors of Alfaro's work on nature and grace:

[5.a] de Miguel 1983. "Revelación y fe. La teología de Juan Alfaro" p. 93-101.
http://books.google.com/books?id=cIg8c4SjLYoC

[5.b] Ruiz de la Peña 1991. "El don de Dios. Antropología teológica especial" p. 29-31.
http://books.google.com/books?id=GxcK9Zqb-nMC
Note: The first part of this book (p. 47-197) presents notions incompatible with the Catholic faith.

[5.c] Ladaria 1993. "Teología del pecado original y de la gracia" p. 16-18.
Note: The first part of this book (p. 33-131) presents notions incompatible with the Catholic faith, as shown in:
http://www.opuslibros.org/Index_libros/Recensiones_1/ladaria_pec.htm

[5.d] Pié i Ninot 2002. "La teología fundamental: 'Dar razón de la esperanza' (1 Pe3,15)" p. 117-118, 150.
http://books.google.com/books?id=xeyG77s7ApcC

[5.e] Sayés 2002. "Teología de la creación" p. 279-283.
http://books.google.com/books?id=UZUwf86cMFkC