An unconventional look at the nature-grace controversy

1. Introduction

This article deals with an intra-Catholic subject: the debate on the relationship of nature and grace between the "integralist" view that Henri de Lubac presented in his 1946 book "Surnaturel" and the view of the thomist commentatorial tradition, a view dubbed "extrinsicist" by de Lubac and which I will call "traditional".  To note, the traditional view has been repeatedly endorsed by papal magisterium as the only position that is compatible with the gratuity of the supernatural order, i.e. with the double gratuity of grace [1].

If someone arriving at this article is not familiar with the subject but would like to learn about it, I suggest reading [2].

In this article I present a new perspective in which to look at the issue, which opens the possibility that a version of de Lubac's integralism MIGHT be compatible in the general case with the gratuity of the supernatural order, i.e. with the double gratuity of grace.


2. Possible creation cases

This new perspective is based on considering the two hypothetical possibilities for the logical sequence of divine decisions related to the creation of a rational being and its possible elevation to participation in the divine nature.  For this logical sequence, there are two possible cases:

Logical Sequence 1 (LS1): antecedent, or initial, definition of nature's specifics

Logical Sequence 2 (LS2): subsequent, or deferred, definition of nature's specifics

where

- "antecedent" and "subsequent" are with respect to the free divine decision to raise the nature in question to participation in the divine nature and subsequent attainment of the Beatific Vision, and

- "antecedent", "subsequent", "initial", "deferred", and the numbered steps below, are to be understood in terms of logical, not temporal sequence.

Logical Sequence 1 (LS1)

1. God freely decides to create a species of beings with rational nature and at that point defines all the nature's specifics. (gratuity of nature).

2. God freely decides whether to raise those beings to participation in the divine life. (double gratuity of grace, if the decision is in the affirmative, an option that we will call LS1.1)

In this case, between logical steps 1 and 2 [3], IF those rational beings, whose nature has already [3] been fully defined in step 1, did not have everlasting natural happiness or natural beatitude as their natural end, but would be forever frustrated or unhappy without attaining the Beatific Vision, THEN the elevation to participation in the divine life ("grace") would not be doubly gratuitous but would be owed to them for the fulfillment of their nature, and therefore God would not be free to decide in step 2 whether to raise them to participation in the divine life, as it would not be in accordance to his absolute goodness to create beings that could not, without fault on their part, fulfill their nature.

Therefore, if all the specifics of a rational nature are antecedently or initially defined, then the simultaneous affirmation of the double gratuity of grace and divine goodness requires that such rational nature has a natural end of everlasting natural happiness or natural beatitude, which is the traditional view.

Logical Sequence 2, option 1 (LS2.1)

1. God freely decides to create a species of beings with rational nature WITHOUT defining at that point all the nature's specifics. (gratuity of nature)

2. God freely decides to raise those beings to participation in the divine life. (double gratuity of grace)

3. God now [3] freely decides whether those beings will (subcase LS2.1.1), or will not (subcase LS2.1.2), have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, as either option would be in accordance to his absolute goodness, GIVEN the free decision that has already [3] been taken to raise them to participation in the divine life.

Thus, subcase LS2.1.2 is a version of de Lubac's integralist position that is compatible with the double gratuity of grace, provided that LS2:

- makes philosophical and theological sense in itself, and
- is compatible with the underlying actual ontological case (as we will see below).

There is a possible variant of LS2, which I call LS2', defined by discarding subcase LS2.1.1 due to the fact that it is intrisically impossible because of assumed ontological constraints. This means that, if God freely decides to raise a species of rational beings to participation in the divine life, then He cannot decide that those beings will have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness. This would be the case if, and only if, capacity (obediential potency) for the supernatural implies necessity for it. To note, this is the actual version of de Lubac's position after Humani Generis.

Therefore, whereas with LS2, which is based on an assumption of intrinsically possible ontological cases (as we will see below), de Lubac's integralism is a possibility with the elevation to the supernatural, with LS2', which is based on a different assumption of intrinsically possible ontological cases, de Lubac's integralism is a necessity with the elevation to the supernatural.

Logical Sequence 2, option 2 (LS2.2)

1. God freely decides to create a species of beings with rational nature WITHOUT defining at that point all the nature's specifics. (gratuity of nature)

2. God freely decides not to raise those beings to participation in the divine life.

3. God now [3] can only decide, in accordance to his absolute goodness, that those beings will have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness.

Clearly this subcase applies also to case LS2'.


3. Ontological constraints

3.1. Preliminary considerations

It is readily seen that it is necessary to consider whether there are ontological constraints in play that render some of the creation cases impossible. Because, taking LS1 as an example, if God freely decides to create a species of triangular beings, then God cannot freely decide whether those triangular beings will have three or four sides.

One of the possible constraints is if a rational nature that has been given the capacity and suitability to be raised to participation in the divine life and subsequent attainment of the Beatific Vision (in short "the supernatural"), has as a result a rigorous necessity for the supernatural in order to achieve true happiness.

It is critical to note that true happiness is not the same as ultimate happiness.  Nobody discusses that the Beatific Vision is the only possible ultimate happiness.  What is in question is whether a created rational being can be truly happy in an everlasting state consistent with his nature as created, contingent being, i.e. an unending transit from potency to act, an unending development.  That such a state is a valid theoretical possibility was the position held by Spanish theologian Juan Alfaro (1914-1993) [4] [5], whose concept of "obediential potency" is a kind of "via media" between the "absolute desire" of de Lubac and the mere "non repugnance" of Cajetan and Garrigou-Lagrange.

I add that such state of natural happiness should necessarily include freedom from evil and risk of evil of any kind, both that which can come from ouside and that which can come from within, as it is hard to see how there can be true happiness when one is still able to screw things up. This consideration is in line with Lk 16:22-26 - if "Abraham's bosom" in that passage is interpreted literally as referring to the "Limbo of the fathers", which was a state of natural happiness, and not alegorically as referring to the Beatific Vision - as Abraham tells the damned rich that "between us and you a great chasm is established to prevent anyone from crossing who might wish to go from our side to yours".


3.2. Study of possible ontological cases

Below I list all the possible ontological cases, where each case comprises a number of possible combinations of capacity (in the sense of "obediential potency" in which Pius X used the term in Pascendi Dominici Gregis, 37) and necessity for the supernatural in created rational beings.

Ontological Case 1 (OC1): capacity and necessity are always present.

OC1: capacity, necessity

This was the position originally presented by de Lubac in Surnaturel (1946) and rejected by Pius XII in Humani Generis (1950). As we will see, it is intrinsically not compatible with any creation case.

Ontological Case 2 (OC2): capacity is always present, but it does not imply necessity.

2.1: capacity, necessity
2.2: capacity, no necessity

Ontological Case 3 (OC3): capacity is always present; there is never necessity.

OC3: capacity, no necessity

This is the traditional position. Also, Alfaro in [4.b] argues convincingly that this is the actual case.

Ontological Case 4 (OC4): capacity is optional, but if present it implies necessity.

4.1: capacity, necessity
4.2: no capacity, no necessity

This was the position subsequently adopted by de Lubac after Humani Generis.

Ontological Case 5 (OC5): capacity is optional, and if present it does not imply necessity.

5.1: capacity, necessity
5.2: capacity, no necessity
5.3: no capacity, no necessity

Ontological Case 6 (OC6): capacity is optional; there is never necessity.

6.1: capacity, no necessity
6.2: no capacity, no necessity

We can now study the compatibility between creation cases and OCs. A creation case is compatible with an OC if and only if, for each possible logical sequence of the creation case, there is at least one compatible subcase of the OC.  If, additionally, all of the ontological subcases are compatible with a logical sequence of the creation case, the creation case is said to be exhaustively compatible with the OC.


LS1.1: compatible with all OC's in which there is capacity but not necessity: 2.2, 3, 5.2, 6.1.

LS1.2: compatible with all OC's in which there is no necessity: 2.2, 3, 4.2, 5.2, 5.3, 6.1, 6.2.

Thus LS1 is compatible with OC2, OC3, OC5 and OC6, and exhaustively compatible with OC3 and OC6.


LS2.1.1: compatible with all OC's in which there is capacity but not necessity: 2.2, 3, 5.2, 6.1.

LS2.1.2: compatible with all OC's in which there is capacity and necessity: 1, 2.1, 4.1, 5.1.

LS2.2: compatible with all OC's in which there is no necessity: 2.2, 3, 4.2, 5.2, 5.3, 6.1, 6.2.

Thus LS2 is compatible with OC2 and OC5, and also exhaustively compatible with them.


As said before, there is a possible variant of LS2, which I call LS2', defined by discarding subcase LS2.1.1.  This means that, if God freely decides to raise a species of rational beings to participation in the divine life, then He cannot decide that those beings will have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness. This would be the case if, and only if, capacity (obediential potency) for the supernatural implies necessity for it, i.e. if, and only if, "intrinsically possible" reality is as described by OC4.  Therefore, by definition LS2' is compatible only with OC4, and it is also exhaustively compatible with it.


It is important to note that this consideration of ontological cases is based on the assumption that there are characteristics or combinations of characteristics of created rational beings that are intrinsically impossible, like a triangle having four sides. Therefore the case is not that God can choose which OC describes reality. Rather, the actual OC that describes reality, i.e. the combination of intrinsically possible ontological subcases, is a given, and God can accordingly proceed with a suitable LS. In other words, in reality it is the actual OC that constrains which LS can be followed by God in the creation process, so that the valid options are:

OC2: LS1, LS2
OC3: LS1
OC4: LS2'
OC5: LS1, LS2
OC6: LS1

Thus, if "intrinsically possible" reality is as described by:

- OC3 or OC6, then the traditional view is the only possible one,
- OC4, then de Lubac's intrinsicist view is the only possible one,
- OC2 or OC5, then both the traditional and the intrinsicist views are possible.


4. Potentially related pauline passage: Rom 8:29

"For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, so that He might be the firstborn among many brothers."

At first reading, this passage lends support to case LS1 and consequently to the traditional position, since the natural way to understand that "God foreknew someone" is that God knew that person in an exact and complete way, and not in a fuzzy or incomplete way.

However, still taking this verse in isolation, "those whom He foreknew" can be interpreted as referring to:

- the universal predestination to be potentially raised to participation in the divine life, or

- the selective predestination to be actually raised to participation in the divine life.

Clearly only the first interpretation, which encompasses all members of the species, is related to the subject in consideration, so that the passage can be invoked to support case LS1. To choose between both interpretations, we must look at the next verse, Rom 8:30:

"And these whom He predestined, He also called; and these whom He called, He also justified; and these whom He justified, He also glorified."

Here the addition of "justified" and "glorified" supports the second interpretation, viz. that the predestination in the previous verse does not refer to the divine design over the entire human species to be potentially raised to participation in the divine life but only to the predestination of those who would be actually raised to participation in the divine life (a predestination that includes the free human response to God's call).


5. Related magisterial statements

Quoting from [1]:

In 1567 Pope St. Pius V condemned Baius’s claim that “The sublimation of human nature and its elevation to participation in the divine nature was due to the integrity of the human being in its first state, and is therefore to be called natural, not supernatural.” (DS 1921)

And Pope Clement XI later condemned the following Jansenist position taught by Quesnel, “The grace of Adam is a consequence of creation and was due to his whole and sound nature.” (DS 2345)

And Pope Pius VI also condemned this position in the bull Auctorem fidei, in which he wrote, “The doctrine of the [Jansenist] synod about the state of happy innocence … insofar … as it intimates that that state was a consequence of creation, due to man from the natural exigency and condition of human nature, not a gratuitous gift of God, is false, elsewhere condemned in Baius and in Quesnel, erroneous, favorable to the Pelagian heresy.” (DS 2616)

Concerning the error of modernism, Pope Pius X wrote: "There is no question now of the old error, by which a sort of right to the supernatural order was claimed for the human nature.
...
And here We cannot but deplore once more, and grievously, that there are Catholics who, while rejecting immanence as a doctrine, employ it as a method of apologetics, and who do this so imprudently that they seem to admit that there is in human nature a true and rigorous necessity with regard to the supernatural order – and not merely a capacity and a suitability for the supernatural, such as has at all times been emphasized by Catholic apologists." (Pascendi Dominici Gregis, 37)

Finally, Pius XII wrote in an encyclical in 1950, four years after the publishing of de Lubac's Surnaturel:

"Others destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision." (Humani Generis, 26)

The last part of Pius XII's statement was easily complied with by de Lubac, by switching from OC1 to OC4.  That modification, though, did not change the situation regarding man, to which all the other quoted statements from former popes referred.

The three statements including "due to" might be solved by a Lubacian by arguing that, since the logical sequence in the creation of man was according to case LS2.1.2, the "due to" consideration does not apply: God freely decided to raise humans to participation in the divine life (double gratuity of grace) and subsequently, or consequently in case LS2'.1.2, decided that they would not have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness.  On the other hand, the objection in the last paragraph of Pascendi regarding the "true and rigorous necessity" will still and always stand.

To this Lubacian argument it could be objected, however, that in subcase LS2.1.2 or LS2'.1.2 the double gratuity of grace is evident only from God's viewpoint and not from the creatures' viewpoint.  Because if the creatures take as a valid starting point for reasoning their own nature, and assuming that they have realized by means of philosophical reflection that they do not have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, they will come to the legitimate conclusion that participation in the divine life is due to their nature for its fulfillment. Thus, without an explicit divine revelation that case LS2 or LS2' was the actual way in which God proceeded when creating them, a revelation that did not take place in actual human history, the creatures, and specifically human beings, would be holding, wholly legitimately from their epistemic viewpoint, the propositions condemned by the Popes above. Which proves that integralism plus creation subcases LS2.1.2 or LS2'.1.2 cannot be the actual case for human beings.


6. A surprising unavoidable solution if the epistemic uncertainty on the subject is unacceptable

Finally I present a logical reasoning which shows that, if it is necessary for our salvation that we know for certain whether we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, then integralism cannot be true in the concrete case of human beings. Ironically, this is the exact reverse of de Lubac's position that extrinsicism was theoretically possible in the general case but was not true in the concrete case of human beings.

In the following reasoning the terms "creation", "created" and "creating" are used in an extended sense to mean all logical steps in cases LS1 or LS2.

a. A creature cannot possibly discern philosophically whether the divine decision process involved in their creation was actually according to case LS1 or LS2.  Rather, the only way they could know that would be via divine revelation.

b. From a and the fact that the divine revelation that took place in actual human history says only that God freely decided to raise human beings to participation in the divine nature, it follows that there is no way at all for human beings ("we" / "us") to know whether we have been created according to case LS1.1 or LS2.1.

c. From the conclusion of b and the fact that God has revealed to us everything we need to know for our salvation, it follows that we do not need to know for our salvation whether we have been created according to case LS1.1 or LS2.1.

d. From the conclusion of c and the fact that for our salvation we need to know with certainty that God acts with both infinite freedom and goodness, it follows that whether we have been created according to case LS1.1 or LS2.1 is irrelevant to our knowing that God has acted with both infinite freedom and goodness when creating us.

e. From the conclusion of c and the fact that for our salvation we need to have some knowledge of ourselves, which includes the knowledge of whether we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, it follows that whether we have been created according to case LS1.1 or LS2.1 is irrelevant to our knowing whether we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness.

f. From the conclusions of d and e and the fact that in case LS1 the simultaneous affirmation of divine freedom and goodness requires that the rational nature in question has a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, it follows that, in the case of human beings, this must also be true in case LS2.1, which means that if LS2.1 was the actual case in the creation of human beings, then it was in the form of subcase LS2.1.1.

In other words, the only way in which the humanly insoluble epistemic dilemma between cases LS1.1 and LS2.1 may be irrelevant to our knowing whether we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness is that, if LS2.1 was the actual case in the creation of human beings, then it was in the form of subcase LS2.1.1.  Thus, whether the actual case was LS1.1 or LS2.1.1, we know that we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness and that God has acted with both infinite freedom and goodness when creating us.

As this conclusion is based on the assumption in step e that it is necessary for our salvation that we know whether we have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness, the situation is quite interesting:
- if we need to know whether we have a natural end, then we know that we have it,
- if we don't need to know, then we don't know whether we have it.

Of course a Lubacian would say that the correct reasoning should proceed the other way: it is the knowledge from Revelation and the Fathers (as interpreted by Lubacians) that we do not have a natural end of everlasting natural happiness which allows us to solve the dilemma between cases LS1.1 and LS2.1 in favor of the latter, specifically in the flavor of LS2.1.2, actually LS2'.1.2. 


7. A thought experiment: analogy with the creation of life

In order to make an analogy with the nature-grace issue, we can simplify the process of creation of life into two steps, which are listed below together with their respective enabling conditions and the analogous steps in the creation/elevation of rational beings:

- creation of life enabled by abundance of Carbon / creation of a species of rational beings (nature)

- creation of complex aerobic life enabled by abundance of atmospheric O2 / elevation of rational beings to participation in divine life (grace)

We can now try to describe the logical sequence of divine decisions related to the creation of life according to LS1 and LS2.

According to LS1:

1. God freely decides to create a species of living beings and at that point defines all the nature's specifics. (gratuity of nature and Carbon)

Thus God decides right in step 1 whether those beings will be complex obligate aerobes, simple facultative aerobes, or simple anaerobes, though He actually cannot choose the first option if we want step 2 to be analogous to that of the creation and elevation of rational beings:

2. God freely decides whether those beings will use O2 (double gratuity of O2).

Clearly for God to be free to decide in step 2 whether those beings will use O2, they cannot be obligate aerobes.

Therefore, since all complex life forms are obligate aerobes, their creation process cannot be described using LS1 in an analogous way to the creation and potential elevation of rational beings.

To this observation, a defender of the traditional view can reply that that incompatibility is not significant for a simple reason: the underlying analogy (basic life enabled by Carbon - aerobic life enabled by O2 / nature - grace) is not valid, because the nature of all life forms, and specifically of complex aerobic life forms, is a unified whole, enabled in this case by (Carbon + O2), so that having a separate second step in which God decides whether those beings will use O2 does not make sense. Rather, when God defines all the nature's specifics in step 1, He decides that they will be complex aerobic beings and as a consequence need O2.

According to LS2:

1. God freely decides to create a species of living beings WITHOUT defining at that point all the nature's specifics, and for that provides an abundance of Carbon. (gratuity of basic life and enabling Carbon)

2. God freely decides that those those beings will have a complex aerobic form, and for that provides an abundance of atmospheric O2 (double gratuity of complex aerobic life and enabling O2)

3. God now freely decides whether those beings will (subcase LS2.1.1), or will not (subcase LS2.1.2), have the possibility of functioning without O2 in a more elementary way, as either option would be in accordance to his absolute goodness, GIVEN the free decision that has already been taken to provide them with abundant O2.

Actually, in the physical realm the analogy with de Lubac's view would be complete, as subcase LS2.1.1 is intrisically impossible because of physical constraints: within the laws that God set in the universe, if God freely decides to give a species of living beings a COMPLEX aerobic form, then He cannot decide that those beings will have the possibility of functioning without O2 in a more elementary way. (There are simple life forms that can function with or without O2, i.e. that are facultative aerobes, but all complex life forms are obligate aerobes: they are enabled by O2 and rigorously need it.)

To this observation, a defender of the traditional view can simply reply that the very concept of LS2 does not make any sense at all, as step 1 is equivalent to God saying:

1. "Let's create a species that will live in the northern latitudes, and let's leave for later the decision of whether it will be a microbe or a woolly massive mammal with a trunk and big tusks. For that, at this stage I need to provide Carbon. Done."

And besides, there is no reason why the laws in the physical realm that mandate that [all complex life forms are enabled by O2 and rigorously need it] would have a correlate of laws in the realm of rational beings that mandate that [all rational beings that have an obediential potency for the supernatural rigorously need it.]


References and notes:

[1] A very good summary of papal statements on the issue was provided by Dr Bryan Cross as comment #79, dated December 30th, 2011, under his article:
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2011/09/nature-grace-and-mans-supernatural-end-feingold-kline-and-clark/

[2] Mulcahy, Matthew Bernard 2008. "Not Everything Is Grace: Aquinas’s notion of “pure nature” and the Christian integralism of Henri de Lubac and of radical orthodoxy"
http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/digitaltheses/public/adt-acuvp238.11012011/index.html

[3] As I said, "between steps 1 and 2", "already" and "now" are to be understood in terms of logical, not temporal sequence.

[4] Works by Juan Alfaro dealing with the issue of nature and grace:

[4.a] Alfaro 1952. "Lo natural y lo sobrenatural: estudio histórico desde Santo Tomás hasta Cayetano (1274-1534)". Madrid.

[4.b] Alfaro 1957. "Trascendencia e inmanencia de lo sobrenatural". Gregorianum Vol. 38, p. 5-50.
http://books.google.com/books?id=XsnS9PibDQIC

[4.c] Alfaro 1972. "Naturaleza y gracia" in "Sacramentum Mundi: enciclopedia teológica" paragraph 4.
http://mercaba.org/Mundi/4/naturaleza_y_gracia.htm

[4.d] Alfaro 1973. "Cristología y antropología: temas teológicos actuales". Ediciones Cristiandad. Madrid.

[5] Coverage by other authors of Alfaro's work on nature and grace:

[5.a] de Miguel 1983. "Revelación y fe. La teología de Juan Alfaro" p. 93-101.
http://books.google.com/books?id=cIg8c4SjLYoC

[5.b] Ruiz de la Peña 1991. "El don de Dios. Antropología teológica especial" p. 29-31.
http://books.google.com/books?id=GxcK9Zqb-nMC
Note: The first part of this book (p. 47-197) presents notions incompatible with the Catholic faith.

[5.c] Ladaria 1993. "Teología del pecado original y de la gracia" p. 16-18.
Note: The first part of this book (p. 33-131) presents notions incompatible with the Catholic faith, as shown in:
http://www.opuslibros.org/Index_libros/Recensiones_1/ladaria_pec.htm

[5.d] Pié i Ninot 2002. "La teología fundamental: 'Dar razón de la esperanza' (1 Pe3,15)" p. 117-118, 150.
http://books.google.com/books?id=xeyG77s7ApcC

[5.e] Sayés 2002. "Teología de la creación" p. 279-283.
http://books.google.com/books?id=UZUwf86cMFkC